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IS THIS BELT ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
John C. Byrnes* 
ABSTRACT 
Widely considered one of the largest and most ambitious infrastructure projects in human history, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] has made major headway since its inception in 2013. 
Although the BRI is formally adopted under the Chinese Communist Party Constitution as an 
initiative to secure “shared growth through discussion and collaboration,” the BRI is much more 
than these words convey. This Comment briefly introduces an overview of the BRI, including its 
components and early research on its effects on participating countries and regions. The Comment 
then conducts an in-depth analysis of four countries who have participated in the BRI with varying 
degrees of success. Next, the Comment discusses various international concerns surrounding the 
BRI, including possible debt diplomacy and military motivations. Finally, the Comment concludes 
that although the BRI should be applauded for its bold aspirations and developments, it should 
also be closely monitored by the international community to mitigate any deleterious effects incurred 
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CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Silk Road, the ancient network of trade routes that 
connected Eurasia and Africa, is heralded to this day as one of the most 
significant examples of the early international exchange of goods and 
ideas between different cultures and nations. The Silk Road of the 
ancient world aided in the development of large cities along trade 
routes, acted as a catalyst for international relations between far-away 
nations, spread wealth and religion, and made the nomadic lifestyle of 
our ancestors more and more unnecessary. 
In today’s increasingly globalized and interconnected world, 
trade between nations has become easier and more accessible than ever 
                                               
 1 Brook Larmer, What the World’s Emptiest International Airport Says About 
China’s Influence, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 13, 2017); Illustration by Andrew 
Rae, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/what-the-worlds-emptiest-
international-airport-says-about-chinas-influence.html. 
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before. However, some nations believe that there is more to be done 
to promote international trade - one of these nations is China. In 2013, 
China unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative, which would further its 
desire to increase trade with other nations in the Middle East, Eurasia, 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and even into the Western Hemisphere.2 
Originally referred to as “One Belt, One Road,” China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (“BRI”), which Chinese President Xi Jinping has called the 
“project of the century,” has entered into its sixth year of progress 
towards creating a twenty-first century Silk Road for Chinese trade.3 
China has promised to invest nearly $1 trillion in infrastructure to over 
60 countries in Eurasia, Africa, and South-East Asia.4 Although these 
infrastructure investments can be great for both aiding the trade 
aspirations of China and the domestic needs of developing nations, 
some experts are concerned that the large loans that these developing 
and smaller nations are taking from China can end in unintended 
consequences. 
This comment will look to address the BRI in three parts. The 
first part will provide an overview of how China has developed and 
implemented the BRI; how it has impacted their economic and trade 
policies; and how it is likely going to shape their approach to 
international trade and affairs moving forward. 
The second part will focus on how the BRI has impacted four 
nations in particular: Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Montenegro. 
Specifically, this section will focus on how the BRI brings with it both 
positive and negative impacts and highlight how, depending on a 
nation’s location and current economic condition, the risks of being 
involved in the BRI can sometimes outweigh its potential benefits. 
This part will also focus on how international legal bodies are looking 
to regulate and monitor the BRI’s implementation in these nations. 
                                               
 2 David Tweed, China’s New Silk Road, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/china-s-silk-road. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up 
the Economic Order, NEW YORK TIMES (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-
road-1-trillion-plan.html. 
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The third part will outline several concerns that the 
international community has regarding China’s involvement in nations 
participating in the BRI. These concerns include fears of predatory 
lending, debt diplomacy, economic colonialism, and disguised military 
expansionism. 
This comment will then conclude by recommending a cautious 
outlook on China’s BRI. While the BRI has much to offer to both 
developed and developing nations who choose to participate in the 
trade program—namely an increase in domestic prosperity —China’s 
ultimate motivations and projected increased influence deserve to be 
observed carefully by the international community. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
A. Components of the Belt and Road and China’s Motivations 
It has been no secret that over the past three decades China 
has made infrastructure development a top priority. China believes that 
a top modern economy is only able to grow when it has ample roads, 
railways, electricity, and telecommunications capabilities.5 To date, the 
BRI consists primarily of two economic corridors. The Silk Road 
Economic Belt links China to both Central and South Asia, and 
Europe. The New Maritime Silk Road links China to South East Asia, 
the Gulf Countries, North Africa, and Europe.6 However, the 
Economic Belt is actually made up of six separate economic corridors.7 
                                               
 5  A 2013 McKinsey & Company study showed that between 1992-2011 
China spent 8.2% of its GDP on infrastructure. This far exceeded what any other 
country spent, including the United States and European Union, who each spent 
2.6% of their GDP on infrastructure during the same period. See Yougang Chen, 
Stefan Matzinger, and Jonathan Woetzel, Chinese Infrastructure: The Big Picture, 
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (June 15 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-
insights/winning-in-emerging-markets/chinese-infrastructure-the-big-picture. 
 6 Belt and Road Initiative, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-
initiative#02. 
 7 In Northern China, the China-Mongolia-Russian Corridor runs from 
Tianjin to Ulan-Ude in Siberia. In Southern China, the China-Indochina Peninsula 
Corridor runs from the Pearl River Delta to Singapore, while the Bangladesh-China-
Myanmar Corridor runs from Kunming to Kolkata. Western China has three 
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Taken all together, these economic corridors comprise nearly 30% of 
global GDP, 62% of the global population, and 75% of known energy 
reserves.8 Through this massive global initiative, China is aspiring to 
reshape global trade with itself as the epicenter. 
In a 2013 speech delivered by President Xi Jinping titled 
“Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future,” 
Xi proposed what he called a “Silk Road Economic Belt.”9 Xi listed a 
multitude of reasons for embarking on the process of developing this 
twenty-first century Silk Road, including: strengthening policy 
communication, improving road connectivity, promoting trade 
facilitation, enhancing monetary circulation, and strengthening people-
to-people exchanges.10 Although these are all underlying motivations 
for the BRI, infrastructure development is considered the central 
motivation. 
In 2008-09, due to the global financial crisis, China saw a 
significant slowdown in GDP growth and adopted a so-called “4 
trillion yuan stimulus package” that mainly focused on infrastructure 
investments and projects.11 This focus on infrastructure development 
was ultimately able to help carry China through the global financial 
crisis. In an apparent parallel to this stimulus plan, it is the central role 
played by infrastructure development and investment that separates 
the BRI from other international cooperation endeavors.12 With this in 
                                               
corridors, which include the China-Pakistan Corridor running between Kashgar to 
Gwadar, the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor linking 5 Central Asian 
countries and 17 West Asian countries, as well as the (6) New Eurasian Land Bridge 
that starts in Jiangsu province, China, and ends in Antwerp, Brussels. See Embracing 
the BRI Ecosystem in 2018, DELOITTE (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-
road-initiative.html. 
 8 Belt, supra note 6. 
 9 President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road 
Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 7, 2013), 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_6656
86/t1076334.shtml. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Yiping Huang, Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, 
framework and assessment, 40 CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW 316 (2016). 
 12 Id. at 319. 
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mind, many of the countries that China has brought into the BRI have 
substantially under-invested in their own infrastructure. Therefore, 
China is filling the need for global investment in infrastructure in 
developing parts of the world.13 With a domestic surplus of steel, 
cement and infrastructure machinery, China’s mostly State owned 
enterprises, through the BRI, are looking toward developing countries 
within the BRI’s geographic sphere to sustain their steady economic 
growth.14 
By investing in infrastructure projects set up through the BRI 
in foreign nations, China is able to give its state-owned enterprises the 
economic output it needs.15 Chinese companies are taking note of the 
potential of the BRI for sheltering their overseas projects. Michael 
Every, head of financial markets research for Rabobank Group in 
Hong Kong eluded to this well-known notion amongst Chinese 
companies, stating “Belt and Road is a political special sauce . . . if you 
drizzle it on anything, it tastes better.”16 
The effects of the BRI projects in Africa highlight the way the 
program is designed to serve the interests of Chinese firms and people. 
Of the 1,073 Chinese firms conducting business across eight African 
nations, only 44% of the local managers for these enterprises are from 
Africa.17 Additionally, only 47% of the Chinese firms’ sourcing was 
from local African firms.18 Although the Chinese investment will 
ultimately likely result in a strong net gain for these African nations, 
                                               
 13 Id. at 319. “In early 2014, the IMF called for more investment in 
infrastructure around the world, as part of the efforts to stabilize economic growth.” 
 14 Perlez and Huang, supra note 4. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Bloomberg Marketing, China’s Empire of Money is Reshaping Global Trade, 
BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/fixed-income. 
 17 Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, Dance of the Lions and 
Dragons – How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve?, MCKINSEY 




 18 Id. 
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there are calls for more emphasis to be placed on local labor resources 
for these projects. 
In summarizing President Xi’s vision, Cao Wenlian, director 
general of the International Cooperation Center of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, a group dedicated to the 
initiative, stated “President Xi believes this is a long-term plan that will 
involve the current and future generations to propel Chinese and 
global economic growth . . . the plan is to lead the new globalization 
2.0.”19 Indeed, President Xi’s plan to have the BRI engrained in China’s 
future has gone so far that, in October 2017, the BRI was officially 
written into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution.20 
As many nations watching the emergence of the BRI have 
noted, China’s growing involvement with foreign nations may also be 
pushed by political, and perhaps military, motivations – this will be 
discussed later in this comment. 
B. Early Research on the Effects of the Belt and Road Initiative 
Although the BRI is in its early stages of development, studies 
have already been published showing the current and potential changes 
that can come along with the initiative. Whenever a country with a 
robust economy, let alone one of the largest economies in the world 
like China, institutes widespread change in how they trade and conduct 
business with the rest of the world, the changes and effects are certain 
to be widespread. 
In terms of the early impact on trade costs and timing, there 
are early signs for optimism for China. A 2018 study compiled data 
from over 1,818 cities that are located in BRI economies and compared 
them to a global database that contained over 1,000 cities in 191 
countries.21 Overall, the findings of the analysis pointed towards 
                                               
 19 Perlez and Huang, supra note 4. . 
 20 Deloitte, supra note 7. 
 21 Francois De Soyres et al., How Much Will the Belt and Road Initiative Reduce 
Trade Costs?, WORLD BANK GROUP (Oct. 15, 2018), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/592771539630482582/pdf/WPS861
4.pdf. 
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significantly reduced shipment times and trade costs due to the BRI. 
Specifically, on a macro level, the world will see a reduction in 
shipment time for goods that will range between 1.2 and 2.5 percent, 
which will lead to a reduction of aggregate trade costs between 1.1 and 
2.2 percent.22 Additionally, these decreases in trade deficiencies are not 
only felt on a global scale. Indeed, for BRI country economies, the 
change in shipment times and trade costs will range between 1.7 and 
3.2 percent and 1.5 and 2.8 percent, respectively.23 Although these 
changes are significant, the largest impacts will be felt in the countries 
where corridors for the BRI are being constructed – shipment times 
along these corridors have declined by up to 11.9 percent and trade 
costs have declined by up to 10.2 percent.24 Although the immediate 
effect of increasing infrastructure development through several 
highways, ports, bridges, and railways have caused the most substantial 
portion of the reduction in trade deficiencies, the study also states that 
these effects are “magnified by policy reforms that reduce border 
delays and improve corridor management.”25 As this highlights, the 
changes the BRI facilitates are not merely infrastructural; the BRI also 
reoriented political and international affairs. 
Another World Bank study addressed whether an improved 
transportation network would encourage more investment and, 
subsequently, more economic growth. The study, conducted in late 
2018, showed two primary findings in terms of investment. 
First, the study showed that there is a significant correlation 
between construction projects by Chinese firms in BRI countries and 
increased direct investment.26 Specifically, according to the analysis 
conducted, a 10% increase in China’s construction activities is 
associated with an increase in outward foreign direct investment from 
                                               
 22 Id. For purposes of this study, “Trade Cost = Tariff + Transport + Time 
Cost” 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Maggie Chen and Chuanhao Lin, Foreign Investment Across the Belt and Road 
– Patterns, Determinants and Effects, WORLD BANK GROUP (Oct. 10, 2018). 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/394671539175518256/pdf/WPS860
7.pdf. 
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China of 7% in the same year, 11% the next year, and 16% in two 
years.27 “This suggests that China’s infrastructure activities overseas 
may serve as a catalyst for Chinese investments in manufacturing or 
services.”28 
Secondly, the research showed that an increase in foreign direct 
investment resulting from reducing transportation costs can have a 
positive effect on GDP, trade, and employment growth, especially for 
lower-income countries.29 The results of the study were found by 
exploring cross-country bilateral transportation cost and foreign 
investment data. The research showed that the transportation 
networks proposed in BRI countries can increase their GDP growth 
by 0.09 percentage points.30 These effects were found to vary by 
region, with 0.01 percentage point growth in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and 0.23 percentage point in Sub-Saharan Africa.31 The 
research also showed that the BRI can actually have a spill-over effect 
through their transportation networks, raising non-BRI Sub-Saharan 
countries’ GDP growth by 0.13 percentage point.32 
However, one of the points of emphasis in much of the early 
research on the BRI has also pointed towards possible negative 
implications stemming from BRI projects in certain countries. A study 
conducted by the Center for Global Development has shown that 
there are serious concerns about sovereign debt sustainability in eight 
countries involved in BRI projects.33 These eight countries are 
Djibouti, the Maldives, Laos, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Pakistan, and Montenegro.34 In all of these countries, there is a high 
risk of indebtedness due to the high ratio of loans to overall GDP. On 
                                               
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt 
Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, CENTER FOR GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY PAPER, (2018), 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-
road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf. 
 34 Id. 
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top of this, many of these countries are continuing, despite warnings 
from international monetary groups, to incur debt over future projects 
that they have invested in alongside China.35 
In order to address issues in countries that are suffering from 
debt distress over BRI-linked initiatives, the Chinese government has 
seemed to provide debt relief in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner.36 
Although many international groups have voiced concerns over the 
debt distress being encumbered by many BRI countries, China has 
“generally refrained from participating in multilateral approaches to 
debt relief, though it does participate in debt relief discussions at the 
international financial institutions and engages informally with IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] staff on individual country cases.”37 
The study notes that China is different from many other major official 
creditors, who “actively participate in multilateral mechanisms dealing 
with sovereign defaults, in particular the Paris Club.”38 Without any 
guiding framework to base China’s approach to debt sustainability 
problems, countries “only have anecdotal evidence of ad hoc actions 
taken by China as the basis for characterizing the country’s policy 
approach.”39 
However, despite the ad hoc approach taken by China, there 
are signs that these practices may be changing, or at least giving way to 
a more uniform approach. In November 2017, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission issued regulations, for the first time, for 
China’s policy banks.40 These regulations emphasized “greater risk 
controls for the overseas activities of The China Development Bank, 
China Exim Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China.41 
                                               
 35 Id. “Mongolia is in a particularly difficult position because its future 
economic prosperity depends, in large part, on large infrastructure investments that 
will increase productivity and facilitate exports.” 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 19. 
 38 Id. at 19. NOTE – The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors 
whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties 
experienced by debtor countries. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, supra note 33. 
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III. AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF FOUR BELT AND ROAD COUNTRIES 
In order to show the varying degrees and intricacies of the BRI, 
it is important to take a holistic view of the countries where the BRI 
has been implemented. When analyzing a global initiative that is taking 
place in over 65 different countries, in very diverse areas of the globe, 
it would be foolish to try to paint in broad strokes. In order to avoid 
this mistake, this comment will focus on four particular countries: 
Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Montenegro. These countries were 
selected due to each of their unique geographic locations, economic 
positions, interactions with the BRI initiatives, and the observed and 
speculated effects of the BRI within their borders. This comment will 
first focus on Kenya, a country where, generally, the BRI has been 
mostly embraced by the local government and population for the 
benefits it has brought. 
A. The Good with some Bad: Kenya 
“They assure us they’re going to bring a lot of money with this 
project . . . they assure us that they’re not crazy.”42 This sentiment is 
being shared by the locals of Lamu, Kenya, where Chinese investment 
in the area’s first coal-fired power plant is taking place.43 Projects like 
the one in Lamu are indicative of Kenya, as a whole, working towards 
attracting more foreign investment – and this is a need that China is 
more than happy to fulfill through the BRI. In order to attract more 
investment, Kenya needs electricity to power a large road-and-rail 
project to connect its landlocked neighbors to a new port.44 Cyrus 
Kirima, the chief operating officer of the coal-powered plant, 
expressed a common Kenyan sentiment regarding these foreign 
investment infrastructure projects: “You need to do business . . . you 
need investment.”45 
                                               
 42 Somini Segupta, Why build Kenya’s First Coal Plant? Hint: Think China, NEW 
YORK TIMES, (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/climate/coal-kenya-china-power.html. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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Although the coal plant project in Lamu is just a small example 
of the investment projects taking place in Kenya through Chinese 
actions, the feeling that development is needed is echoed across the 
country. One of the largest BRI infrastructure projects that has taken 
place in Kenya is the Standard Gauge Railway. The train currently runs 
over 293 miles from Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, to the port city of 
Mombasa, and it makes this trip twice a day.46 This railway is the largest 
investment Kenya has made since its independence in 1963 at $3.8 
billion for the first phase of the construction alone, which equaled 
roughly six-percent of Kenya’s GDP.47 Over 90% of the funding for 
the project came from China.48 However, on the Standard Gauge 
Railway’s one-year anniversary in 2018, it appeared that expectations 
had been exceeded. Original projections showed that the railway would 
see its first 900,000 passengers by year five. However, by the end of its 
first year the Standard Gauge Railway has already recorded its first 
million passengers, and is currently seeing nearly five-thousand 
passengers per day.49 
The early success of the Standard Gauge Railway has been a 
great source of optimism for those in Kenya’s government who see 
foreign investment as a great way to continue to move the country 
forward. “The SGR [Standard Gauge Railway] and the Belt and Road 
Initiative are very important in the relationship between China and 
Africa, and indeed between China and Kenya” stated Raphael Tuju, 
the secretary general of Kenya’s ruling Jubilee Party.50 “It is key in the 
sense that it opened the hinterland for trade, for ease of doing business 
                                               
 46 Eyder Peralta, A New Chinese-Funded Railway in Kenya Sparks Debt-Trap 
Fears, NPR, (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/08/641625157/a-new-
chinese-funded-railway-in-kenya-sparks-debt-trap-fears. 
 47 CNN Staff, Kenya Marks the First Anniversary of the Standard Gauge Railway, 
CNN, (Jul. 16, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2018/07/16/marketplace-africa-kenya-
standard-gauge-railway-vision-a.cnn. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Shi Yinglun, Kenya Reaps from Belt and Road Initiative Amid Infrastructure Boom: 
Official, XINHUANET, (Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
08/29/c_137428736.htm. 
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and I think if there is anything that underlines and brings out the 
cooperation between China and Kenya, it is the SGR.”51 
This optimism is also shared by Kenya’s President, Uhuru 
Kenyatta. Following Kenyatta’s meeting with Chinese President Xi at 
the 2018 China-Africa summit in Beijing, Kenyatta voiced gratitude 
towards China’s involvement in Kenya, and looked toward the future 
of their involvement together.52 Specifically, President Kenyatta 
stressed his view that Kenya should be moving on from the pure debt-
financing they had been using prior, principally with the Standard 
Gauge Railway, toward a new emphasis on Public Private 
Partnerships.53 Coincidentally, President Kenyatta has noted that the 
priorities laid out for the next Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) align themselves well with what the Kenyan government has 
called its “Big Four Agenda”: Manufacturing, Food Security & 
Nutrition, Universal Health Care, and Affordable Housing.54 “Each of 
these sectors offers viable investment opportunities. I therefore 
welcome Chinese companies to invest in any of these priority areas.”55 
It is no coincidence that President Kenyatta is looking to work 
more with Public Private Partnerships as opposed to the debt financing 
that was undertaken with the SGR. This is important to President 
Kenyatta because, although Kenya has seen success with its 
infrastructure investments, the debt on these investments still needs to 
be paid. 
Although the loans provided to the Kenyan government by the 
Chinese Export-Import Bank did not give the appearance that they 
were designed to be predatory,56 Kenya now owes $5.3 billion to China, 
                                               
 51 Id. 
 52 Official Press Release from the President of the Republic of Kenya, Big 
Win for Kenya as Chinese Private Investors Line Up for Public Partnerships, (Sept. 4, 2018), 
http://www.president.go.ke/2018/09/04/big-win-for-kenya-as-chinese-private-
investors-line-up-for-public-partnerships/. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 China Exim Bank provided a $1.6 billion concessional loan and a 
commercial loan of $1.633 billion for a total of $3.233 billion. The $1.6 billion 
concessional loan is good for 20 years at a 2% interest rate and a payment period of 
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and the reminders of this fact are ever-present on the railway. Most 
notably, at the entrance of every single rail car, an image of the Kenyan 
flag is flanked by an image of the Chinese flag.57 In August 2018, 
Kenya’s public debt surpassed the five-trillion Kenyan Shilling mark, 
equivalent to roughly $4.6 billion.58 Unsurprisingly, China accounts for 
a large chunk of this public debt. 
Many global analysts, such as the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, have released reports that have 
raised alarms over the accumulation of debt by Kenya, with the 
ICAEW stating, “the pace of public debt accumulation and the lack of 
a clear communication strategy regarding the government’s plan to 
address deficits have raised concerns about the sustainability of 
Kenya’s public finances.”59 Debt management is starting to become a 
major issue for Kenya. John Mutua, a program officer at Kenya’s 
Institute of Economic Affairs stated that, “Carrying more commercial 
debt means interest payment will soon become our biggest challenge 
in public debt management. Kenya’s official policy is to go for 
concessional loans, but we haven’t managed that very well.”60 
Although the Standard Gauge Railway, the first of potentially 
many Chinese BRI projects in Kenya, has been seen mostly as a 
success, there are certainly both optimistic and pessimistic views of 
Kenya’s interaction with China. On one hand, Kenya has a new 
transportation system thanks to Chinese investment, and revenues 
from the system have already exceeded expectations. Therefore, more 
Chinese investors are looking for more opportunities in the country. 
                                               
13 years with a 7 year grace period (project #31777). The $1.633 billion preferential 
concessional loan has a ‘interest rate of six months’ valid for 15 years with a payment 
period of 10 and grace period of 5. See A. Dreher et al. (2017). Aid, China, and 
Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData 
Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData, 
https://china.aiddata.org/projects/37103. 
 57 Peralta, supra note 46. 
 58 Angeline Mbogo, Kenya’s Public Debt Surpasses Sh5 Trillion Mark; 58% of 
GDP, THE KENYAN WALL STREET, (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://kenyanwallstreet.com/kenyas-public-debt-surpasses-sh5-trillion-mark-58-
of-gdp/. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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However, the potentially disastrous amount of debt that Kenya is 
accumulating due to their dealings with China counterbalances the 
aforementioned benefits. Additionally, reports have stated that 
Chinese workers are not only taking over many of the principle 
positions on the Standard Gauge Railway—jobs that were supposedly 
to be reserved for native Kenyans—but local Kenyans are also facing 
underemployment and discrimination.61 
Although China’s BRI projects in Kenya have had positive and 
negative consequences, it can still be said that Kenya has gained more 
than it has lost from its endeavors with China. However, not all 
countries that take part in the BRI have had positive results that are 
sufficient to justify the negative sideeffects and costs. As illustrated by 
the following two countries, sometimes taking a gamble with China’s 
BRI can end in unintended disaster. 
B. Only the Bad: Sri Lanka & Malaysia 
1. Sri Lanka 
Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport was designed to 
handle nearly a million passengers per year; it has also been called “The 
World’s Emptiest [sic] International Airport.”62 This moniker was 
given for good reason, because Mattala International Airport, despite 
its capabilities, serves only a few dozen passengers per day.63 In fact, 
the airport is so desperate for revenues that it has started renting out 
its unused cargo terminals to store rice and other goods.64 Even with 
this unintended use of its cargo terminals, Mattala Airport only 
manages to produce revenues of roughly $300,000 per year, which 
does not begin to cover the $23.6 million per year, over eight years, 
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repayment plan that Sri Lanka must follow.65 On the receiving end of 
the repayment plan is China. 
As disastrous as business for the airport has been, it is 
unfortunately only one of multiple bad investments made by Sri Lanka 
as a result of the BRI. In addition to the Mattala Airport, Sri Lanka also 
has a seldom used $1.5 billion deep-water port that was built and 
financed by the Chinese.66 Both of these infrastructure investments 
came through the BRI, but how did they become such disasters for the 
Sri Lankan government? 
Following a decades long civil war, the Sri Lankan government, 
headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, determined that the country’s 
only airport, located in the largest Sri Lankan city of Colombo, was 
beginning to receive too much traffic and that a second airport needed 
to be built.67 Unfortunately, the government decided to develop the 
airport, and other infrastructure projects, in a very underdeveloped 
area of Sri Lanka, Hambantota – the home region of then president 
Mahinda Rajapaksa.68 Rajapaksa was hoping to make the development 
of the Hambantota region the crowning achievement of his regime – 
a fact that was highlighted by the decision to name the airport, deep-
water port, and international cricket stadium after President 
Rajapaksa.69 
Coming out of a long and expensive civil war, the Sri Lankan 
government had to look to outside funding for these projects. At the 
time, Sri Lanka had poor relations with Western powers, including the 
United States and European Union, due to alleged war crimes 
committed by the Rajapaksa regime that resulted in both the United 
States and European Union turning off economic aid and 
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concessions.70 Thus, Sri Lanka looked to another large foreign 
economy to help fund its infrastructure projects. China, ever eager to 
seize an opportunity to export some of its industrial capacities, obliged. 
In the form of a loan, China supplied $190 million of the $210 million 
building cost for the Mattala International Airport.71 The Rajapaksa 
regime’s aspirations did not stop with the Mattala Airport. Chinese 
funding was then sought for a $1.4 billion multi-stage deep sea port, a 
world-class cricket stadium, and new highways to connect all of the 
projects.72 
For China, Sri Lanka’s geographic location, situated in the Bay 
of Bengal to China’s south, is perfect for a port in its maritime BRI. 
Such an island port would be perfect in the so-called “String of Pearls” 
of ports and islands that China could use for trade and other 
geopolitical activities in the Indian Ocean and surrounding area.73 
Indeed, there are common themes present in both the “String of 
Pearls” theory, and the maritime aspirations of the BRI, such as a wish 
for establishing key ports, infrastructure development programs, and 
collaboration with regional governments.74 Thus, Chinese motivations 
to gain an interest in Sri Lanka, and its new desire for a deep sea port, 
served both its BRI aspirations and possible geopolitical goals equally. 
With such a large amount of loans being issued to Sri Lanka 
from China, there were fears that Sri Lanka may default. This 
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culminated in Rajapaksa suffering a presidential election defeat at the 
hands of Maithripala Sirisena, who during the campaign actively drew 
attention to the idea that Rajapaksa was selling Sri Lanka’s future to 
the Chinese through these expensive infrastructure loans.75 
Rajapaksa’s ambitions to revitalize the Hambantota region of 
Sri Lanka failed, and when the new Sirisena regime took control of the 
Sri Lanka government, its options for dealing with the loans were 
limited. While the government tried to reexamine the deals made with 
China, and halted construction on the deep sea port, nearly 95% of Sri 
Lanka’s revenues were going towards servicing its foreign debt.76 
Ultimately, Sri Lanka handed over the Hambantota Deep Sea Port to 
China in a deal that gave China 70% equity in the port and a 99-year 
lease deal.77 Mismanagement of government funds following these 
massive investments with China has led to a debt-crisis in Sri Lanka 
that has gotten so bad that the Auditor General, in February 2018, 
could not state with certainty how much public debt the country 
owed.78 
The case of Sri Lanka is an example of what can happen if a 
country is not diligent and disciplined in its dealings with China and 
their BRI. Their investments can backfire, and result in not only 
massive public debt, but the surrender of resources to the Chinese. 
Although it can be argued that Sri Lanka lacked sufficient caution and 
scrutiny, the same cannot be said about another country in Southeast 
Asia. 
2. Malaysia 
Malaysia, a prosperous Southeast Asian country, appears to 
have seen the writing on the wall when it came to its investment 
projects with China’s BRI. In fact, during his general election campaign 
in 2018, newly elected prime minister Mahathir Mohamad emphasized 
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the charges of corruption levied against his predecessor, Najib Razak.79 
Former Prime Minister Razak had been formally accused of corruption 
and money laundering in connection with the Malaysia Development 
Berhad, a Malaysian strategic development company. It is believed that 
the Malaysian Development Berhad may have been the recipient of 
Chinese funds that were illegally taken from two pipeline projects that 
were being undertaken by Razak’s regime.80 
This is why since taking office Mohamad has tried to devise a 
way to undo the damage that his predecessor had done in his dealings 
with China and the BRI. Upon taking office, Mohamad stated publicly 
that due to Razak entering Malaysia into lopsided deals with no exit 
clauses with China, Malaysia is now desperately trying to avoid 
financial ruin.81 “I believe China does not want to see Malaysia become 
a bankrupt country . . . if we have to pay compensation, we have to 
pay . . . we must find a way to exit these projects . . . this is our own 
people’s stupidity.”82 
Since taking office, Prime Minister Mohamed has suspended 
three major Chinese-backed BRI projects.83 The Malaysian Finance 
Minister, Lim Guan Eng, stated that the government ordered the 
suspension of two pipeline deals in addition to a railway that, all 
together, were worth $22.35 billion.84 Malaysia’s deals with China will 
continue to be under the tight scrutiny of Prime Minister Mohamed, 
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who will continue to review any deals that may be seen as dubious in 
nature.85 Prime Minister Mohamed has been quite blunt about 
Malaysia’s interactions with China since assuming office, stating that 
Malaysia would only be pursuing “fair trade” with China, and has 
publicly warned about a possible new version of colonialism. This was 
seen as a reference to China’s dealings with other countries leading to 
massive amounts of debt for the host nation. This would then result 
in countries becoming more beholden to China’s will in order to relieve 
their debt.86 
From the eyes of many financial experts, it would make sense 
that Prime Minister Mohamed would pull out of the three major BRI 
projects with China, given that the Malaysian national debt is estimated 
to be $252 billion, or roughly 65% of the country’s GDP.87 However, 
although Prime Minister Mohamed has been publicly critical of China 
in its dealings with Malaysia, he has not been hesitant to heap blame 
on his predecessor, Razak: 
“It is not about the Chinese, it is about the Malaysian 
government. They borrowed huge sums of money and now we have 
problems trying to repay the money that they have owed . . . That is 
Malaysians playing around with money, not even doing proper 
feasibility studies and due diligence before going into business.”88 
However, Prime Minster Mohamed has eased his criticism of 
China, and this may be because of the strong economic relationship 
Malaysia has with China. Malaysia’s largest trading partner is China, 
and a large chunk of Malaysia’s population have livelihoods that are at 
least partly reliant on Chinese investment and good diplomatic and 
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economic ties between the two countries.89 This puts Malaysia in a very 
tricky position when dealing with Chinese investment and BRI 
opportunities – both politically and economically. 
Malaysia’s unique situation with China has drawn the attention 
of many in the international community. Many are wondering where 
the relationship will go with the new administration under Prime 
Minister Mohamed, and what these setbacks spell for China’s BRI 
aspirations in Southeast Asia. Yun Sun, director of the China Program 
at the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think-tank, has speculated about 
the implications for both sides following the setbacks over the past few 
years.90 
Sun believes that China has attributed the cancellation of the 
three major BRI projects in Malaysia to Malaysia’s current state of 
domestic politics. This belief also serves to disregard the liabilities 
associated with the three BRI projects – such as their many 
irregularities and their unviable nature, in many aspects.91 Sun sees the 
current state of affairs as a cooling period between the two countries 
as Malaysia’s new regime settles in. Prime Minster Mohamed does not 
necessarily want to antagonize China with his current foreign policy 
decisions, but is aiming to strengthen economic ties that would yield 
more comprehensive benefits to Malaysia.92 Sun has stated that Prime 
Minister Mohamed’s recent visit to China “indicated his strong 
interests in industrial, technological and trade cooperation, but this is 
significantly different from cooperation based on infrastructure 
projects that are funded and built by China, the key priority of its Belt 
and Road Initiative.”93 
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However, one of the key implications that China is focused on, 
because of its recent setbacks with Malaysia, is the escalation of 
concern coming from Southeast Asia. Sun agrees with the notion that 
most Southeast Asian nations, both those on Asia’s mainland and the 
island nations, are having growing concerns over China’s rapid growth 
in influence in the area as a result of their aggressive financial 
endeavors.94 This fear is highlighted by the fact that China’s BRI 
projects in this region are heavily involved with financing – and not 
investment. China actually ranks fifth in terms of foreign direct 
investment in Southeast Asia – the bulk of China’s involvement in 
Southeast Asia is in the form of commercial and concessional loans 
that other nations will eventually have to pay back to China.95 Thus, 
due to the failings of Sri Lanka, countries like Malaysia are now trying 
to slow down Chinese financing in the region, and sounding the alarm 
to other countries doing business with China and its BRI. Sun 
concludes that although individual countries, like Malaysia, are able to 
pull back a bit on Chinese investment in the area, the greater trend 
upward of Chinese investment in the area is unlikely to change anytime 
soon. This leaves Sri Lanka and Malaysia as cautionary tales for other 
nations.96 
C. The Questionable: Montenegro 
“Their fiscal space has shrunk enormously. They have strangled 
themselves. And for the time being this is a highway to nowhere.”97 
Situated in Southeastern Europe, on the shore of the Adriatic 
Sea, is the small Balkan country of Montenegro, a country that only 
gained its formal independence from Serbia in 2006, dissolving the last 
of what used to be Yugoslavia.98 In this Balkan nation, one of the last 
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things you would expect to see is the large and pronounced presence 
of China – but through its BRI initiative, China has now poured 
millions of dollars and thousands of its own workers into 
Montenegro.99 The large Chinese presence stems from the wish of the 
Montenegro government to expand the country’s ability to connect its 
port city of Bar, to the city of Boljare in the landlocked nation of Serbia 
on Montenegro’s northeastern border.100 Montenegro will seek to 
connect these two key cities through the construction of a 103 mile 
highway, the Bar-Boljare Highway, equipped with tunnels and bridges 
to navigate the mountainous terrain contained within Montenegro.101 
In order to take on such an ambitious project, Montenegro, a 
country that is ranked 161 out of 230 countries in terms of GDP 
(purchasing power parity), needed outside financing.102 Western 
financial institutions were not interested in investing in Montenegro. 
In fact, two feasibility studies, one carried out by the French firm Louis 
Berger and the second by the American company URS both concluded 
that there would not be enough traffic on the highway to justify its 
construction.103 “The low current traffic volumes and the weak 
economic forecasts mean that the economic benefits of the proposed 
route do not provide adequate return on the investment” stated URS 
in its assessment.104 
Nonetheless, China was willing to aid in Montenegro’s push 
for improved infrastructure. In order to fund just the first 41 
kilometers of the highway, the first phase of construction, Montenegro 
needed to borrow nearly 809 million euros from China, which nearly 
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equates to one-fifth of Montenegro’s entire GDP.105 This amount has 
sent Montenegro’s debt soaring, and has forced the government to 
take drastic measures such as raising taxes, partially freezing public 
sector wages, and ending a tax benefit for mothers.106 In addition, the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) stated that Montenegro cannot 
afford to take on anymore debt in order to complete the entire 
ambitious project.107 The IMF bluntly stated in its report that “fiscal 
space does not exist to finance the remaining phases of the highway 
with debt” even though it is likely the highway will cost an additional 
one billion dollars.108 
In addition to the 809 million euros Montenegro received from 
China’s state-funded Export-Import Bank, a loan which covers 
roughly 85% of the cost of the first section of the Bar-Boljare 
Highway, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (“CRBC”), a 
Chinese state-owned company, will be undertaking nearly 70% of the 
work.109 CRBC was also able to include in its deal with the Montenegro 
government that all of its imported construction materials, equipment, 
and other goods would not be subject to customs and taxation.110 
These two conditions represent an unfortunate loss of revenue for 
Montenegro in its own infrastructure endeavor – both for the potential 
it could have had for local laborers and for the potential gain in tax 
revenue. Also under the current contract is the stipulation that an 
arbitration court in China would have jurisdiction in the event of any 
potential legal dispute.111 These favorable terms have increased the 
confidence of Chinese workers, with Kang Shifei, deputy project 
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manager for CRBC, stating that “CRBC expects to build the future 
sections of this project.”112 
To make matters more uncertain for Montenegro, the 
government did not hedge against currency swings, and forgot to 
include a key turnpike in the original blueprint for the highway, which 
has only exacerbated their current debt problems.113 This puts 
Montenegro is a precarious position, a position that can leave them 
vulnerable to the political will of China. Montenegro will have to pay 
back the Chinese loan, at two-percent interest, between the years 2020 
and 2040 after an initial five-year grace period.114 Most surpringly, in 
the event of Montenegro defaulting on the loan, China would be able 
to seize parts of Montenegro’s territory.115 
Given the terms and risks of the agreement, Vatroslav Belan, 
Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, stated that, “this 
highway is not a Chinese investment. This is the investment of the 
government of Montenegro. We are taking the risk, that is the 
difference.”116 However, Belan does stress the positive outlook the 
Montenegrin government has on the infrastructure project, stating 
“[through] the growth of the economy, which will be grown thanks to 
the highway, we will earn enough money to pay for the highway.”117 
Montenegro’s Prime Minister, Duski Markovic, has stated that the 
highway will be completed at any cost, and he has characterized those 
who have dismissed the feasibility of the project as “disbelievers.”118 
Many in Montenegro, as well as international bodies outside of 
Montenegro, have concern about where the all of the debt can lead the 
country. Jelisava Kalezić, a former Professor of Civil Engineering at 
the University of Montenegro, understands the need for a major 
                                               
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Steven Bartus, China’s New Highway Could Make or Break this Poor European 
Country, VICE NEWS, (June 5, 2018), 
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ywen7x/chinas-new-highway-could-make-
or-break-this-poor-european-country. 
 115 Bartus, supra note 114. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 GCR Staff, supra note 108. 
2020 Is This Belt One Size Fits All? 8:2 
749 
highway in Montenegro, but believes that the highway would have 
been a well-received infrastructure project in “2002 or 2003, when our 
economy was in a much better state” and Montenegro was not 
threatened with bankruptcy.119 Mladen Grgic, a China/Balkans expert 
from U.C. Berkeley, stated that, to the people of Montenegro, the 
highway is a big deal, and it reminds the people of “the days of grand 
socialist projects in the region.”120 However, despite the fond feelings 
felt by some of the population of Montenegro, Grgic warns that the 
highway is beginning to resemble a trap. “Now that it’s been started, 
the politicians can’t stop it – no matter how harmful it might be. And 
frankly, they don’t want to.”121 Due to the high levels of debt and the 
uncertain timeline surrounding the completion of the Bar-Boljare 
Highway, Montenegro’s future, and its relationship with China as its 
creditor and partner, remains uncertain. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE BELT AND ROAD 
INITIATIVE 
As China has unveiled and implemented its BRI over the past 
six years, the international community has been watching closely in 
order to monitor the progress of the initiative. While watching the 
initiative’s progress, the international community has been weighing 
the pros and cons of the project as it relates to international affairs and 
the interests of individual countries. In the eyes of the international 
community, China is doing more than investing in foreign 
governments and creating opportunities for its state-owned companies 
and banks - it is also leveraging and enhancing its geopolitical position. 
Although Chinese officials claim that their involvement in developing 
nations is entirely benign in terms of geopolitical aspirations, and it is 
just an example of their “win-win cooperation,” many nations are 
skeptical of the BRI’s overall motivation.122 
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One of the more perplexing issues with China’s interactions 
with nations willing to participate in the BRI is China’s ad hoc 
approach to settling issues of debt.123 The international community, 
and the countries that are dealing with the BRI, share concerns over 
China’s willingness to, at times, write off or restructure debt and extend 
further lines of credit, but at other times to solely seek the assets of 
nations in order to service the loans.124 In a study conducted by the 
Center for Global Development, the conclusion was that “without a 
guiding multilateral or other framework to define China’s approach to 
debt sustainability problems, we only have anecdotal evidence of ad 
hoc actions taken by China as the basis for characterizing the country’s 
policy approach.”125 
One international body that has particular concerns with 
China’s approach to sovereign debt is the Paris Club. The role of the 
Paris Club is to find “coordinated and sustainable solutions to the 
payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries.”126 The Paris 
Club is comprised of 22 countries that have a “large exposure to other 
States worldwide;” China is not a full member of the Paris Club, but 
participates on an ad hoc basis.127 As an ad hoc member, China is free 
to withdraw from discussions or participation at any time and is invited 
on a case-by-case basis to join on a country-specific discussion, which 
is based on a signaled interest in specific countries and issues.128 China 
has shied away from multilateral approaches to debt relief aside from 
its informal participation with the Paris Club and the International 
Monetary Fund.129 This stands in contrast to many other official 
creditors, all of whom actively participate in multilateral mechanisms, 
especially the Paris Club. 130 The international community believes it 
would be in their best interest if China, as they continue to increase 
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their status as an international creditor, were to decide to fully 
participate in the Paris Club and end their history of non-transparent 
credit activities. 131 
China’s ambitions with the BRI have also drawn backlash from 
its main competitor nations in terms of foreign investment – including 
the United States, India, and Japan.132 Although these countries are 
unable to match Chinese investment in the region, they are attempting 
to stymie Chinese influence with their own influence. The United 
States recently passed the BUILD Act in October 2018, which created 
an International Development Finance Corporation with $60 billion 
to lend.133 Japan has increased its lending in Southeast Asia in response 
to the BRI.134 India has sought to have greater diplomatic influence 
over its surrounding region, which had successfully swayed Bangladesh 
to pass on a Chinese BRI initiative to develop a deep-water port for 
the nation.135 These efforts can prove to be a large detriment to the 
BRI. 
The United States, known for its large international influence, 
has been particularly skeptical of China’s BRI. Alarmed by the 
potential for corruption, and the vulnerability of some nations’ 
sovereignty to Chinese investment, Vice President Mike Pence 
announced the new Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative.136 The 
initiative is funded with more than $400 million, with the aim to 
“empower the region’s citizens, combat corruption, and strengthen 
sovereignty.”137 The United States has also joined Japan and Australia 
in a trilateral partnership which was formed in order to “mobilize 
investment in projects that drive economic growth, create 
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opportunities, and foster a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-
Pacific.”138 The trilateral initiative is widely seen as a broader effort to 
reassert influence in the Pacific during a time that China is increasing 
its diplomatic pressure in the area through the BRI.139 This new 
strategy involves the use of $133 million in new technology, energy and 
infrastructure initiatives in Asia, which is all a part of President 
Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy.140 Ideally, through the trilateral 
initiative, the United States, Japan, and Australia would be able to 
provide high-quality alternatives to BRI loans issued by China.141 
Along with economic and diplomatic concerns from the 
international community about the BRI, there have also been growing 
military concerns about the influence of China and the BRI. 
Throughout China’s building of infrastructure projects in Southeast 
Asia there have been concerns about the possible military implications 
of the endeavors, but these suspicions did not have much factual basis 
behind them. That was until the first explicitly military component was 
added to the Maritime portion of the BRI in the form of a base in 
Djibouti which was constructed with the goal of providing support for 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).142 From that point 
forward, the Pentagon’s suspicion has only heightened. It was revealed 
in 2018 that the Pakistani Air Force and Chinese officials had 
completed a secret proposal to have Pakistan build Chinese military 
jets, weaponry and other hardware with all of these military projects 
being designated as part of China’s BRI.143 With its plan in Pakistan, 
China is now explicitly tying a BRI proposal to military purposes. The 
United States had thought that after suspending billions of dollars in 
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security aid to Pakistan in early 2018 that it would cause Pakistan to 
increase its cooperation with the United States.144 However, it appears 
that it has only caused Pakistan to find a new source of security aid in 
China. 
The deep-water port constructed by the Chinese in the 
Pakistani port city of Gwadar was originally built with trade and 
economic concerns in mind – giving both the Chinese and Pakistanis 
a quicker route to access the Arabian Sea.145 However, now that the 
military implications of the BRI have come more into focus, many are 
now seeing the strategic advantage the port can give to China to play 
against the United States and India if the tensions in the area were to 
worsen to the point of naval blockades.146 In fact, Pakistan as a whole 
has a multitude of military benefits for China to explore: “shared 
borders and a long history of cooperation; a hedge in South Asia 
against India; a large market for arms sales and trade with potential for 
growth; a wealth of natural resources.”147 Moreover, military experts 
have predicted that China will use the deep-sea port at Gwadar to 
expand upon its naval fleet, after selling eight submarines to Pakistan 
for $6 billion; the Chinese could then use the equipment it sells to 
Pakistan in order to refuel its own submarines in the port.148 Vice 
President Pence made his thoughts on the potential military 
implications of China’s building of ports in foreign nations heard in 
his October 2018 speech at the Hudson Institute: 
China uses so-called debt diplomacy to expand its 
influence . . . Just ask Sri Lanka, which took on massive 
debt to let Chinese state companies build a port of 
questionable commercial value. Two years ago, that 
country could no longer afford its payments, so Beijing 
pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly 
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into Chinese hands. It may soon become a forward 
military base for China’s growing blue-water navy.149 
It appears that the security and military implications have been 
known by those in the international community who have been 
watching the development of the BRI. “Most people working in 
military circles knew there was a security dimension to [the BRI] so 
this [New York Times report] is just a confirmation at best,” said James 
Chin, director of the Asia Institute at the University of Tasmania.150 
Chin added that it is often very difficult, near impossible, for a country 
to separate military power and economic power when they are in the 
process of striving for greatness.151 However, despite the military 
implications of the BRI, Chin also agrees that “in the end, BRI could 
end up as a logistical route to sell China-made stuff and nothing 
else.”152 
V. CONCLUSION 
“The future is coming now; the Belt and Road is how.”153 
Although the sentiments the BRI may invoke vary across 
different nations and people, the one fact that is not disputed is the 
high level of innovation, and the huge impact the BRI is having on the 
world in only six years. The trillion-dollar development deal has grown 
to 118 participant nations at the close of 2018.154 The total value of 
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BRI construction projects has reached $380 billion, while investments 
in the projects stand at $180 billion.155 
As seen from the analysis of several countries throughout this 
comment, the effects of the BRI on nations with different 
backgrounds and economic conditions can vary from good, to bad, to 
dubious. In Kenya, there is reason for both optimism and caution as 
the SGR has exceeded expectations. Yet, this has the Kenyan 
government searching for a way to service their growing debt to China. 
The nations of Sri Lanka and Malaysia are both backed into a 
precarious corner with their dealings with China’s BRI and are looking 
to dig themselves out of bad financial decisions that have left their 
countries in a hole of debt. Montenegro is situated at the peak of a 
growing mountain of debt over its Bar-Boljare highway, and the 
coming decisions made by the Montenegrin government will decide 
whether the country will be able to sustain itself or fall deeper into 
debt. 
Developing nations will more often than not need creditors 
and prosperous nations to aid them with funding in order to grow their 
economies. However, the methods and rationales behind the funds 
being invested in these nations must always be analyzed by the 
international community. Although China has stated repeatedly that 
the BRI is an initiative that is only interested in win-win transactions 
with developing nations, some of the results of their initiative have 
caused those countries, and others in the international community, to 
be skeptical of China’s investment strategies and possible ulterior 
motives. 
The international community, as well as international monetary 
groups, should exercise caution in the degree of oversight they provide 
over China’s BRI. Although the BRI can have a positive impact on the 
regions it is involved in, it will not excuse the international community 
from giving its due diligence. Additionally, countries that wish to host 
BRI projects should explore their options for creditors, including 
getting the recommendation of the Paris Club or other international 
crediting organizations. If countries wish to proceed with China in a 
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BRI project, they should make sure the terms of the agreement are not 
only clear, but not lopsided in China’s favor to a degree that would 
endanger the future of the nation’s economy. In all likelihood, the BRI 
is a project that will be around for decades to come, and along with it 
will come a mix of prosperity and peril – the exact ratio of this mixture 
is an answer that will only come with time. 
 
